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Transformation of the Urban Rail Sector 
through PPP
PHANG Sock Yong
Abstract 
The recent proliferation of Public Private Partnership (PPP) projects in numerous cities 
has transformed the urban rail sector. The enthusiasm for PPPs can be explained by 
improved understanding of efﬁciency gains and risks of bundling and unbundling 
tasks as well as availability and lower cost of private sector ﬁnance. The four main PPP 
approaches identiﬁed are: (i) development of new systems through DBFOs (Design-
Build-Finance-Operate); (ii) concessioning of rail and subway services; (iii) sale of state-
owned operators through share issue privatisation; and (iv) PPPs for infrastructure 
maintenance and upgrading. This paper examines examples of successes and failures to 
better understand the complexities involved in PPP decisions and the trade-offs cities 
make when deciding between alternative strategies.
Introduction
Last year, in 2008, for the first time in human 
history, the earth’s population became more 
urban than rural; by 2050, the United Nations 
has forecasted that a full 70 percent of the 
human population will be living in cities.1 By 
mid century, the total urban population of 
the developing world is expected to more 
than double from 2.3 billion in 2005 to more 
than 5 billion. These urbanisation trends pose 
tremendous challenges for urban planners, 
particularly with regard to urban infrastructure 
and transit financing.
 
In the past two decades, urban planners and 
policy makers have increasingly looked to the 
private sector to help meet the financing gap 
for capital intensive urban rail systems. Public 
Private Partnerships (PPPs) have delivered 
metro systems or lines that would otherwise 
not have been built, or would only have been 
built at a later date. Some of these projects 
have however run into problems of varying 
magnitudes. This paper reviews the rationale 
for adopting the PPP approach, examines the 
strategies used and the successes and problems 
in order to arrive at a better understanding 
of the trade-offs and complexities involved in 
choosing a strategy for the sector.
Reasons for Recent Enthusiasm
When the wave of privatisation swept through 
the transport sector in the 1980s, there was 
deregulation and privatisation in airlines, 
ports and airports; restructuring in intercity 
and commuter rail; and competitive tendering 
in bus services. The urban rail sector was 
left largely untouched. Prior to 1993, public 
sector ownership and operation of urban 
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Grimsey and Lewis (2004) makes the following 
distinction between privatisation and PPP: 
“within a PPP the public sector acquires and 
pays for services from the private sector on 
behalf of the community and retains ultimate 
responsibility for the delivery of the services, 
albeit that they are being provided by the 
private sector over an extended period of time 
(i.e. 25 years or longer). By contrast, when 
rail systems was widespread. Japan was the 
only exception. The main obstacles to private 
sector involvement were: (i) high cost and 
long payback periods; (ii) fare revenues that 
did not cover costs; (iii) the need for public 
subsidies; and (iv) the complexities of forming 
and sustaining coalitions and partnerships 
necessary in this sector (Due 2003; Gomez-
Ibanez and Meyer 1993).
In the early 1990s, Argentina launched an 
ambitious plan to privatise its entire transport 
sector. It was then described as “the only 
country outside Japan that had private urban 
commuter railways and the only country in the 
world that had granted a private concession 
to operate its subway” (Gomez-Ibanez 1997). 
Since then, PPPs in urban rail have come to 
be adopted all over the world. Why did PPPs 
become so popular? 
Kumar and Prasad (2004) succinctly describes 
PPPs as a strategy that combines the best 
of the public and private sector: “Through 
PPPs, the advantages of the private sector—
innovation, access to finance, knowledge of 
technologies, managerial efficiencies, and 
entrepreneurial spirit—are combined with the 
social responsibility, environmental awareness 
and local knowledge of the public sector in an 
effort to solve problems.” Through a PPP, risks, 
resources and rewards can be appropriately 
allocated to the private sector.
In the 1980s (and prior to experimentation 
with urban rail PPP), policymakers had 
developed better understanding of complex 
urban environments and infrastructure sectors. 
Vertical disintegration or unbundling of entire 
industries in the telecoms, power, water, and 
transport sectors introduced private sector 
participation and competition in previously 
state run or regulated monopoly sectors. 
In this exercise of “taming complexity”2 for 
privatisation of the infrastructure sector, 
Britain has been the pioneer. The experience 
gained was introduced into the urban rail 
sector in the 1990s. In the context of urban 
rail, a project may be roughly broken down 
into four principal “tasks”: (i) define and 
a government entity is privatised the private 
firm that takes over the business also assumes 
the responsibility for service delivery…A PPP 
is a formal business arrangement between 
the public and private sectors…regulation 
through contract and the lack of government 
disengagement define much that is distinctive 
about a PPP.”
Distinction between Privatisation and PPP 
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The recent enthusiasm for PPPs can 
therefore be explained by two main 
factors: (i) improved understanding 
of efficiency gains and risks of 
bundling and unbundling tasks in 
the sector; and (ii) availability and 
lower cost of private sector finance.
too, it has strong incentives to ensure that it 
is designed and built such that operation and 
maintenance costs are minimised over the 
length of the contract. 
 
It may appear strange for policy makers to argue 
that PPPs are good because the private sector 
is a cheaper source of financing or insurance 
than the public sector, as “it is hard to imagine 
an agent that is more able to borrow or to 
provide insurance than the government” (Hart 
2003). However the government is not always 
able to borrow at a lower cost than the private 
sector, or even to borrow at all in the case of 
some cities (Bettignies and Ross 2004). One 
of the most frequent reasons governments 
employ PPP is that they are cash-strapped and 
too debt-laden already. It is not surprising that 
PPPs tend to be more common in countries 
where governments suffer from heavy debt 
burdens (Hammami et.al. 2006). 
design; (ii) finance; (iii) build and procure the 
physical assets; and (iv) operate and maintain 
the assets to deliver the services. 
How should the policymaker decide if the 
whole or part of the system should be provided 
by the public sector or through a PPP? The 
answer depends on a detailed understanding 
of the numerous risks involved in these 
projects, followed by a careful assessment of 
whether the private or public sector is better 
able to manage the risks. The perceived high 
risks of urban rail projects is one reason why 
these systems were provided by the public 
sector in the past.
Even with public provision, the design and build 
(D&B) part is usually tendered to the private 
sector. PPP arrangements further bundle 
D&B contracts with other functions such as 
operation and maintenance (O&M) or finance 
to exploit the complementarities between 
the various tasks that can reduce costs. For 
example, packaging private financing and 
building can reduce the risks of construction 
delays and project cost overruns. Under public 
procurement, public sector managers may 
be so far removed from their principals (the 
taxpayers) that project cost overruns may be 
more likely. Moreover under a PPP, the private 
partner may recover damages if delays are 
caused by the government, thus reducing 
the risk of such delays. Bundling O&M and 
private finance with D&B can also help to 
reduce project costs. The consortium that has 
to build and finance the project has strong 
incentives to ensure that it is well designed. 
If it has to operate and maintain the system 
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The recent enthusiasm for PPPs can therefore 
be explained by two main factors: (i) improved 
understanding of efficiency gains and risks 
of bundling and unbundling tasks in the 
sector; and (ii) availability and lower cost of 
private sector finance. Figure 1 (adapted from 
Bettignies and Ross, 2004) shows how these 
drivers affect the PPP decision.
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Strategies and Cases
Phang (2007) has classified urban rail PPP 
strategies into four broad approaches: (i) the 
development of new systems through Design-
Build-Finance-Operate (DBFO) agreements; (ii) 
the concessioning of rail and subway services; 
(iii) the sale of state-owned operators through 
share issue privatisation; and (iv) PPPs for 
infrastructure maintenance and upgrading. 
Table 1 summarises the responsibilities of the 
private and public sectors for infrastructure 
and operations under each strategy. 
The upper-left quadrant is the traditional 
public sector model—the government owns 
the infrastructure and operates the system. 
The lower-right quadrant is the Design-Build-
Finance-Operate (DBFO) PPPs where the 
private sector is involved in both operations 
and infrastructure. The lower-left quadrant 
refers to operating concessions of rail and 
subway services where infrastructure is owned 
by the public sector. The upper-right quadrant 
is the strategy employed by the London 
Underground: infrastructure ownership, 
maintenance and upgrading are transferred 
to the private sector, while the public sector 
remains responsible for operations. Share issue 
privatisation or Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) 
Figure 1: Public provision or PPP decision for urban rail transit
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
NO
NO
Table 1: PPP strategies for urban rail
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INFRASTRUCTURE
Public Private
OPERATIONS
Public Public provision Infrastructure maintenance and upgrading
Private Operating concessions 
Share issue privatisation 
DBFO
Share issue privatisation 
Relationship-specific 
assets?*
Spot Markets Complex or uncertain 
exchange environment? 
Complementarities or economies 
of scope between design, 
construction and operations?
Large capital outlay and government 
borrows more cheaply?
Public Provision
Long Term 
Contracts 
(PPPS)
Unbundled
contracts#
DBOMS
DBFOS
PFIs
* Relationship-specific 
assets – Assets specifically 
designed and built/made 
to the specification of 
the purchaser
# Separate contracting for 
different system functions
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Table 2: Adoption of PPP strategies in urban rail 
involve public listing of state-owned operators 
—the infrastructure may remain publicly owned 
(as in the case of Singapore) or bundled with 
the operations (as in Hong Kong).3
Table 2 shows the PPP approaches adopted in 
various cities. 
Design-Build-Finance-
Operate strategy
The DBFO strategy is most commonly used for 
the development of new systems. Successful 
DBFO projects in the urban rail sector include 
the Hudson-Bergen LRT in the United States, 
as well as the Docklands LRT and Croydon 
Tramlink in London. French local authorities 
have traditionally relied upon a private operator 
to carry out their capital investment program 
within a strictly public financing framework. In 
recent urban rail projects in Toulouse, Grenoble 
and Strasbourg however, local authorities have 
opted for a PPP framework (Rochefort 2000). 
Both the Union Pearson Air Rail Link in 
Toronto and the Richmond Airport Vancouver 
Project (the Canada Line) were awarded 
as DBFO contracts in 2003 and 2005 
respectively through competitive bidding. This 
is a departure from the traditional practice of 
complete reliance on public sector financing 
for urban rail. Other successfully completed 
DBFO urban rail projects are listed in Table 2. 
Without the involvement of private sector, 
many of the above lines would either have 
not been built at all, or would have had their 
construction delayed substantially. 
Operate & Maintain concession
The use of O&M concession strategy is often 
seen in cases where the government has largely 
Transformation of the Urban Rail Sector through PPP
INFRASTRUCTURE
Public Private
OPERATIONS
Public Public provision 
- USA
Infrastructure maintenance and upgrading 
- London Infracos
Private Operating concessions 
- Stockholm
- Buenos Aires
- Rio de Janeiro
- Singapore’s North-East 
Line
Share Issue 
Privatisation 
- Singapore’s North-South 
and East-West Lines
DBFOs
- Hudson-Bergen LRT (US)
- Docklands LRT and Croydon Tramlink (UK)
- Toulouse, Grenoble and Strasbourg (France)
- Union Pearson Air Rail Link and the Richmond 
Airport Vancouver Line (Canada)
- Brisbane airport rail (Australia)
- KL Star and Putra LRTs and KL Monorail 
(Malaysia)
- Bangkok Skytrain and Blue Line (Thailand)
- Manila MRT3 (Philippines)
- Jakarta Monorail (Indonesia)
- Beijing Subway Line4 (China)
- Mumbai and Hyderabad metro systems (India). 
 
Share Issue Privatisation 
- Hong Kong
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written off its investments in the rail lines. 
There is no need for the new private owners/
operators to recover the investment. Argentina 
pioneered PPPs in urban rail in Buenos Aires 
in the early 1990s when it offered 20-year 
concessions for private entities to operate 
services and execute investment plans defined 
and funded by the state (Robelo 1999). The 
concessions attracted a large number of bids 
and by May 1995, all seven lines had been 
transferred to the concession winners. Rio de 
Janeiro followed shortly in 1997/98 with two 
urban rail concessions of 20 and 25 years (see 
Phang 2007 for details).
Stockholm Transport has awarded 5 to 10-year 
contracts for operating its three metro rail lines, 
its light rail system, the suburban railway service 
as well as commuter rail services. It normally 
leases vehicles to contractors and owns the 
tracks and facilities. In some instances, station 
staffing is also contracted out.
In Singapore, the Land Transport Authority 
awarded a 30-year concession to run the brand 
new S$4.6 billion 20-km North-East Line and 
two adjoining LRT systems to the public-listed 
SBS Transit Ltd. 
Risks and high costs in PPP projects 
Designing long term PPP contracts in an 
uncertain macro environment remains a 
challenging task for both the public and 
private sector partners.4 There are the risks 
of incomplete contracts and its associated 
problems. While policy makers and the private 
concessionaires may try to anticipate every 
risk and ensure that each risk is properly 
allocated or shared in the partnership, there 
are limitations to foresight. It is impossible 
to plan for every potential contingency. A 
regulatory framework is therefore necessary 
and contracts should be designed to allow for 
re-negotiations and contract extensions.
Designing long term PPP contracts 
in an uncertain macro environment 
remains a challenging task … 
contracts should be designed to 
allow for re-negotiations and 
contract  extensions.
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Within a PPP, the public and private sector 
partners face different specific risks. The public 
sector bears a diverse set of risks including 
interruption to work program or services, cost 
overruns, political risks, project buyout and 
non-performance risks, absence of potential 
replacement and post-contractual lock-in 
which can lead to opportunistic behavior by 
the private partner (Aoust et.al. 2000, p.59).
For the private sector, there remain the dangers 
of the obsolescing bargain for foreign investors 
venturing into infrastructure (Wells and 
Gleason 1995; Irwin et.al. 1997; Vernon 1971). 
Infrastructure investments, once made, are not 
potable and run the risks of expropriation at 
the worst, or the gradual erosion of investors’ 
rights and privileges. Appropriation of the 
investor’s profits without causing it to leave can 
arise from changes in government priorities or 
policies, or the public sector’s failure to comply 
with specific commitments made under the 
PPP. Paradoxically, while high risk for private 
investors may justify high returns, such high 
returns for infrastructure projects may result in 
higher risk of expropriation or appropriation.
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construction costs believed to be much less. 
The KL Monorail began operations in 2003. 
It posted losses from the start, became 
insolvent and was nationalised last year. The 
lines are currently owned and operated by 
government-owned companies.
 
In Buenos Aires, the initial performance of 
the 20-year concessions awarded in 1994 
won plaudits from observers around the 
world. Private concessionaires infused capital 
and management skills, turning around rail 
systems that were on the verge of collapse. 
The Argentine 2001 economic crisis however 
placed the PPPs under tremendous stress. 
The government could not pay the operating 
subsidies on time and also imposed a fare 
freeze. The concessionaires responded with 
service curtailment and lower service levels, 
resulting in long delays for commuters. 
Commuter anger spilled over into ugly scenes 
of riots and vandalism of trains on a number 
of occasions.
The United Kingdom, being the most 
experienced amongst PPP practitioners, also 
had its share of problems. To enable private 
financing of £8 billion over 15 years for the 
London Underground, ownership of the track, 
signaling, bridges, tunnels, lifts, escalators, 
stations and trains were transferred in three 
parts to private infrastructure companies 
(infracos). The contracts would last 30 years, 
but with prices agreed for only the first 
7½ years. London Underground Limited 
continued to run the train services. In 2003, 
Metronet, one of the two successful consortia 
which won the bids, took control of two-
thirds of London Underground’s infrastructure 
Another problem with PPPs is the high 
transaction and governance costs. 
Transformation of the Urban Rail Sector through PPP
Another problem with PPPs is the high 
transaction and governance costs. For 
example, the net present value of the 
PPP contracts to modernise the London 
Underground was estimated to be about £16 
billion and the cost of setting it up: about £500 
million (Phang 2007). In addition, there are 
the governance costs of administering these 
arrangements over the life of the contract.
Problems encountered by 
some PPPs
Not all PPPs take off. The Jakarta Monorail 
suffered from financial problems and frequent 
changes in partners. The project has involved 
and dropped numerous partners from 
Malaysia, Singapore, Japan, South Korea, 
Dubai, Hong Kong since it was first awarded. 
In March 2008, the developer announced 
that it has officially abandoned the project. 
Numerous pylons to support the future track 
have since gone missing.
The successful completion of a system also 
does not guarantee its longer term viability. 
In Kuala Lumpur, the Star and Putra LRT 
lines were completed in time for the 1998 
Commonwealth Games and in the midst of 
the Asian Economic Crisis. After a few years 
of operation, both lines faced serious financial 
difficulties and were subsequently “bailed 
out” in 2002 by the government in the 
nation’s biggest ever corporate restructuring, 
with a payout of MR5.5 billion. Critics viewed 
the sum involved as excessive, with actual 
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and became responsible for maintaining and 
improving nine lines, including 150 stations. 
In 2007, Metronet slid into administration, 
triggering a strike by workers concerned over 
jobs and pensions. The massive strike stopped 
all services on nine lines, bringing London to 
a virtual standstill. In May 2008, Metronet’s 
business was transferred to two companies 
owned by Transport for London. 
Public Procurement or PPP?  
A Complex Policy Decision
The above recent problems show that an 
urban rail PPP is a complex policy decision. 
Policy makers will need to consider numerous 
trade-offs: lack of technical knowledge on rail 
management versus lack of knowledge on 
PPP project management; complementarities 
through bundling versus greater control from 
unbundling; recurrent short term concessions 
versus incomplete long term concessions; pro-
efficiency benefits of competitive tendering 
versus synergies achievable from long term 
relationships; production costs reduction 
versus transaction and governance costs 
incurrence. The choice of strategy therefore 
requires great care. The consequences of the 
wrong choice can be costly and long lasting.
Transformation of the Urban Rail Sector through PPP
Privatisation
Infraco Concessions
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Figure 2: PPP risk transfer to the private sector
* Modiﬁed to include infraco concessions
 Source: The Canadian Council for Public Private Partnerships
 at http://www.pppcouncil.ca/aboutPPP_deﬁnition.asp
The Scale Of Public Private Partnership:
Risk Transfer & Private Sector Involvement
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Figure 2 depicts the choice of PPP strategy 
as one of risk allocation and risk preference. 
According to the diagram, DBFOs and infracos 
would be technically considered less risky for 
the public sector when compared to O&M 
PPPs because more risks and responsibilities 
are transferred to private sector partners.
I would prefer to analyse the PPP decision 
using Figure 3 (adapted from Taleb 2008). 
Figure 2 suggests that we live in the domain 
of predictable risk distributions. It assumes we 
know the relevant risk distributions and can 
quantify and allocate them neatly. However, 
the world we live in can be very unpredictable. 
Extreme events can occur, and we have 
witnessed quite a number recently in the 
financial sector. 
The PPP decisions can be simple in terms of 
payoff. For operating concessions, either 
the services run or they don’t. The payoffs 
involving infrastructure is more complex. 
We would optimistically like to think that risks 
can be quantified, retained or transferred, as 
in the upper right quadrant in Figure 3. But 
the reality is that many PPPs involving private 
infrastructure, such as DBFOs and the London 
infracos, probably belong in the lower right 
quadrant. The probability of failure is not 
known and negative impacts and fallouts can 
be unexpectedly large. 
For Singapore’s SMRT Corporation Ltd and 
Hong Kong’s MTRC Corporation which are 
majority government owned, either the 
government supports the venture or it doesn’t. 
Government’s partial ownership of these 
companies can be viewed as risk mitigating 
strategies. In Singapore’s case, it changes the 
associated risk domain of the long term O&M 
concessions from unpredictable to known. 
Hong Kong’s MRTC, a DBFO company with 
complex payoffs, has been grouped under 
“known” risk domain. Unlike other DBFOs, 
this categorisation is “realistic” rather than 
“optimistic” as partial government ownership 
helps to minimise the uncertainties and 
risks involved. 
Not surprisingly, a recent World Bank 
review (Annez 2007) concluded that 
private participation in infrastructure (PPI) 
in developing countries “has disappointed, 
playing a far less significant role in financing 
infrastructure in cities than was hoped for 
…” Urban PPI investments accounted for 
only a 10% share of the total investment 
in infrastructure. Of these, 25% of total 
transactions in urban areas were classified 
Transformation of the Urban Rail Sector through PPP
Figure 3: The PPP decision
PAYOFF
Simple Complex 
DOMAIN
Known risk 
distribution
- Short term O&M concession contracts
- Singapore 
- DBFOs
- Infracos 
- Hong Kong
Unpredictable - Long term O&M concession contracts - DBFOs 
- Infracos
} Optimistic
Reality
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as problem transactions, as opposed to 10% 
in total.
Conclusion
Notwithstanding the problems that have 
arisen, PPPs have played a transformational 
role in urban rail sector. There are no unique 
solutions or templates to follow with regard 
to choice of strategy. In arriving at a decision, 
policy makers will need to have a clear vision 
Vancouver’s Canada Line (2009)
Vancouver’s Canada Line comprises 19.2 km 
of track serving Vancouver, Richmond and 
the Vancouver International Airport. It began 
operations in August 2009, a few months 
ahead of schedule and in time for the 2010 
Winter Olympics. The line has been built 
with funding provided by both government 
agencies and a private partner. The project 
was put out for competitive bidding in 2003 
and awarded in 2004 to the consortium 
InTransitBC. Under the DBFO agreement, 
InTransitBC was contracted to design, build, 
partially finance, operate and maintain the 
Canada Line for a 35-year period.
The total cost of the project has been 
estimated at C$1.9 billion, with InTransitBC’s 
share estimated at C$657 million (2003 
dollars) plus construction cost overruns (www.
canadaline.ca). One of the public agencies 
contributing to the funding of the project is the 
Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority, 
TransLink. TransLink has agreed to guarantee 
90% of projected ridership and to make up 
the shortfall in revenue if this is not achieved. 
The PPP arrangement has attracted its fair 
share of controversy. While proponents 
argued that private involvement allowed for 
construction costs to be known and fixed 
upfront, detractors questioned the ridership 
projections and highlighted the longer term 
risks of the PPP to taxpayers (Redlin 2003).
Bangkok’s BTS Skytrain (1999)
The Bangkok Skytrain, in operation since 5 
December 1999, is a DBFO PPP project that 
has transformed public transportation in the 
crowded city. It is an elevated rapid transit 
system which serves downtown Bangkok. The 
line (present system length of 28.7 km) was 
to be financed from fare revenues with the 
Bangkok Metropolitan Authority providing all 
the right-of-way for free by allowing the line 
to be built over important arterial streets.
With a price tag of over US$1.5 billion, all of 
which was to be purely privately financed, 
the project attracted much international 
attention. Tanayong Corporation, a Thai real 
estate company, won the 30-year concession 
of the objectives and a deep understanding of 
the context to fully appreciate the advantages 
and limitations of PPPs. The transaction 
costs can be high and long term success is 
dependent on an array of factors spanning 
political, economic and institutional. For PPPs 
to be sustainable solutions, governments must 
remain central actors, the PPP strategies must 
be appropriately designed and regulated, and 
commuters must ultimately benefit.
Transformation of the Urban Rail Sector through PPP
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in foreign currency, while its revenues were 
primarily in baht. A controversy over fares that 
BTS could charge had to be brought before 
an arbitration panel. And all these were before 
Skytrain opened for service in December 1999 
(at fares ranging from 10 to 40 baht), some 
three years later than as stipulated in the 1992 
concession contract (Perez 2004). 
Since its opening, ridership has been below 
the forecasted 570,000 level: year 1 ridership 
was just one-quarter of forecast; the system 
at present carries an average of 450,000 
passengers per working day. While fare 
box revenue has been sufficient to cover 
operating costs, the ability of BTS to service its 
substantial construction debt remains a source 
of continuing concern.
partly because it had offered the lowest fare 
—12 baht (increased to 15 baht in 1992 after 
negotiations began). Tanayong subsequently 
created a separate company, the Bangkok 
Mass Transit System Public Company Limited 
(BTS), to build the system and own the 
concession. The concession contract provided 
for fare increases every 18 months thereafter 
with the increase in consumer price index. 
There were also provisions for increases in the 
event of exceptional circumstances, including 
major changes in foreign exchange rates. 
Project implementation was far from smooth: 
there were lengthy disputes over the site of the 
train depot, going underground or remaining 
elevated, as well as location of support 
pillars. Financiers for the projects grew to 
include Siemens, the German government’s 
international development bank, a syndicate 
of Thai banks, as well as the International 
Finance Corporation, the World Bank’s private 
sector lending arm. 
The Asian financial crisis and the devaluation of 
the Thai baht hit the BTS hard as many foreign 
loans, construction and equipment costs were 
Transformation of the Urban Rail Sector through PPP
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Notes
1.  UN-HABITAT, State of the World’s Cities Report 
2008/9, at www.unhabitat.org
2.  This term is borrowed from Barabasi (2005)’s article 
`Taming Complexity’ on complex systems and 
networks in the sciences.
3.  While the sale of state-owned operators through 
share issue privatisation does not constitute a PPP 
when following the traditional definition of PPP, 
the two cases involving the urban rail sector are not 
outright privatisation. Instead, they involved public 
listing of partially state-owned companies that 
have previously been given operating franchises. 
This justifies their inclusion as a PPP strategy. See 
Phang (2007) for details of the Singapore SMRT and 
Hong Kong MTRC IPOs in 2000 as well as detailed 
evaluation of the various strategies.
4.  These issues are not specific to the rail sector and arise 
generally for infrastructure PPPs (see Phang 2009). 
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